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Abstract
A puzzle that faces public administrators within regulatory networks
is how to balance the need for public or democratic accountability with
increasing demands from interest groups and elected officials to utilize the
expertise of the private sector in developing process-oriented programs
that ensure compliance. This article builds upon the network governance
accountability framework developed by Koliba, Mills, and Zia to explore
the dominant accountability frames and the accountability trade-offs that
shape the process-oriented regulatory regime used by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to oversee and regulate air carriers in the United
States.
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As industry processes become increasingly complex, regulatory agencies,
often faced with demands for austerity and reductions in traditional inspection activities, have relied more on incentives, self-monitoring, and other less
prescriptive tools to ensure compliance with government regulations and
industry best practices (Gilad, 2010; Gormley, 1986; Parker, 2002). The shift
from government-centered to process-oriented regulatory regimes including
self-disclosure and self-audit programs has led to a proliferation of actors
from the public, private, and non-profit sectors involved in compliance, monitoring, and oversight functions previously reserved for government agencies. This proliferation of actors has drastically altered the “principal-agent”
relationship between regulator and regulated firm to one that is increasingly
transactional and built upon the sharing of information related to the internal
operation of the firm within regulator networks (Carpenter & Krause, 2015;
Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010). The shift from a traditional principal-agent to a
transactional and networked regulatory regime has serious implications for
accountability given the heterogeneous perspectives and motivations of
actors involved in ensuring compliance. The challenge of ensuring accountability in a process-oriented regulatory regime is particularly difficult in complex industries such as aviation.
Over the past two decades, aviation safety regulation has undergone a fundamental shift from a government-centered approach focused on governmental inspections of aircraft and pilots to a process-oriented regime focused on
information and data exchange between frontline operators, air carriers, and
regulatory agencies. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed several voluntary disclosure programs in partnership with air carriers
and employee unions to compliment their traditional inspection activities by
offering frontline employees the opportunity to disclose violations to the
FAA or the air carrier for reduced enforcement action. The data collected
through voluntary disclosures allows the FAA and the air carrier to identify
safety hazards and trends while also targeting their inspection and audit programs. In addition, the FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs provide valuable secondary information on the safety culture of an air carrier to the agency
(Mills & Reiss, 2013). While these programs have obvious benefits to both
the FAA, air carriers and employee unions, an unexplored element of these
programs is the degree to which they shift the accountability structures of
both public and private entities responsible for ensuring aviation safety in the
United States. The aviation industry provides an interesting case to examine
accountability trade-offs in regulatory networks due to the unique goal congruence (i.e., safety) between regulators and industry, and the significant
reputation risks presented by an aviation disaster to both air carriers and the
industry as a whole.

1480

Administration & Society 50(10)

This article will investigate the dominant accountability structures in the
FAA’s process-oriented regulatory approach to aviation safety. Adopting the
network accountability framework developed by Koliba, Mills, and Zia
(2011), we assess the degree to which process-oriented regulatory regimes
and the voluntary disclosure programs that are often used to foster information exchange between regulated entities and regulators shift traditional conceptions of accountability. Using a dataset of over a dozen interviews with
aviation safety inspectors and air carrier safety officials along with participant observations of collaborative safety processes and secondary sources of
data including Congressional hearings and inspector general reports, we
describe and analyze the FAA’s aviation safety regime including two of the
voluntary disclosure programs used to foster information exchange: the
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the Voluntary Disclosure
Reporting Program (VDRP). We also develop a case study of an incident in
2010 involving Southwest Airlines (SWA) that illustrates the challenges of
ensuring accountability in process-oriented regimes. The case studies are
used to analyze the degree to which voluntary disclosure programs rely on
complimentary accountability mechanisms that have traditionally been conceptualized as dichotomous or opposed (e.g., democratic and market-based
accountability mechanisms).
We argue that to have effective process-based regulation, regulators and
elected officials must design regimes that balance multiple accountability
regimes to prevent actors from relying solely on their preferred accountability mechanisms. Put differently, if regulators rely only on the voluntary disclosure of incidents by firms without the threat of other accountability
mechanisms such as fines or revoking of an operating certificate (i.e., good
cop/bad cop enforcement strategies), then firms will often rely on the most
familiar and arguably important accountability mechanism to them: shareholder accountability. In addition, we argue that balancing accountability
regimes is easier to achieve for regulators when a third party, in our case,
employee unions, is given authority to assist in the facilitation of processoriented regulatory programs. This suggests that a diversity of interests in the
facilitation of process-oriented regulatory programs helps prevent actors
from relying too heavily on one particular accountability mechanism. In our
case, the presence of employee unions in one voluntary program helps prevent industry from engaging in large-scale regulatory deception while also
helping prevent regulators from using self-disclosed data in punitive actions
against employees and air carriers.
While the study presented here is based on two voluntary programs in one
federal agency operating in a complex industry, we believe that its conclusions are generalizable to a number of other regulatory environments. First,
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while the alignment and strength of the incentives by all actors in the network
to ensure safety is strong, several other regulatory arenas such as the regulation of HIV clinics, nuclear power plants, auto industry, and chemical plants
have similar alignment of goals between regulators and industry (Heimer &
Gazley, 2012). Second, our analysis is very applicable to other high-reliability
industries such as nuclear power, deepwater oil exploration, and chemical production where one regulatory failure can lead to significant reputation damage
to not only the individual non-compliant firm but also the entire industry
(Mills & Koliba, 2015). Finally, the study here analyzes the dominant
accountability regimes in aviation regulatory networks through routine and
extreme cases. We feel this approach provides significant leverage to explore
accountability within networks and is one that lends itself to replication
across a variety of regulatory environments including food safety (Verbruggen,
2013), financial regulation (Larson, 2013), and oil exploration (Mills &
Koliba, 2015).

Framing Network Accountability
Accountability is “the obligation to give an account of one’s actions to someone else, often balanced by a responsibility of that other to seek an account”
(Scott, 2006, p. 175). Extensive literature addresses the complexity of
accountability in modern states (Behn, 2001; Mashaw, 2006; May, 2007;
Reiss, 2011; Scott, 2006). The most thorough treatment of accountability
within regulatory governance networks was conducted by May (2007), who
used an accountability framework developed by Romzek and Dubnick (1987)
to show how political, legal, bureaucratic, and professional accountability
structures vary across prescriptive, process-based, and performance-based
regulatory regimes. In his examination of regulation in building and fire
safety, food safety, and nuclear power plant safety, May (2007) found that a
shift in prescriptive to process-based regulatory regimes has led to a substitution of professional accountability for bureaucratic accountability structures.
While this finding is a significant contribution, it does not address the shift
from a government-centered regulatory approach to one based more on process-oriented approaches that are contingent upon certain comfort levels
among regulators, elected officials, and, to some degree, citizens for more
market-driven and collaborative regulatory mechanisms. A framework that
encompasses the role of markets and collaborative ties is needed. A more
nuanced governance network accountability framework (Koliba et al., 2011)
allows for a more in-depth analysis of the role that salience and complexity
play in determining the dominant accountability structures within regulatory
governance networks by juxtaposing market, democratic, and vertical and
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horizontal accountability structures. This broadened view of accountability
allows for the comprehension of more heterogeneous mixture of complementary and competing factors.
The governance network accountability framework used here was first
applied to the response and recovery efforts following the landfall of
Hurricane Katrina to analyze intergovernmental relations in the response and
recovery efforts (Koliba et al., 2011). Building from Romzek and Dubnick’s
(1987) seminal work, the authors expanded their accountability framework to
include not only citizen, legal, bureaucratic, and professional accountability
but also market-based accountability mechanisms along with collaborative
accountability often found in governance networks. The authors identify
three accountability frames: democratic, market, and administrative, and
found that there was a tension between bureaucratic and collaborative
accountability structures found within the administrative accountability
frame, which led to confusion and a breakdown of administrative accountability between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
American Red Cross, and other volunteer organizations, as well as failures in
democratic accountability of the intergovernmental network responsible for
the preparation, response, and recovery efforts following the disaster. The
governance network accountability model has been used to examine the
accountability trade-offs challenging global attempts to develop international
treaties to address climate change (Zia & Koliba, 2011) and to identify the
breakdowns in accountability that led to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
(Mills & Koliba, 2015). In the latter, the authors apply the framework to a
regulatory network and conclude that shareholder accountabilities (directed
at profit maximization) usurped bureaucratic regulatory controls and professional standards, and led to the disaster. The FAA case presented here examines an industry that has had a much more robust legacy of process-oriented
regulation, due in large part to the extreme emphasis placed upon safety not
only by the regulator but also by industry. This robust legacy, that we argue is
still vulnerable, is built on the establishment of a culture of cooperation and
an authentic participatory decision-making model involving pilots and
employee unions.
Table 1 outlines the application of the governance network accountability
framework to regulatory governance networks at the federal level. The framework addresses the explicit standards and implicit norms that guide the relationship between those rendering account and those to whom accounts are
rendered. Of particular interest is the market accountability frame, which is
divided into three distinct, but interrelated, components: shareholder, consumer (Scott, 2006), and labor accountability. Shareholder accountability
usually calls for the maximization of profit as the driving, explicit
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Vertical over
management/labor

Horizontal with owners

Vertical and horizontal
relations with
management

Shareholder/owner

Consumer

Labor

Market

Relational
power

Elected representatives Vertical over public
sector
Citizens (and interests Horizontal accesses
groups)
to public sector
organizations/elected
officials
Legal (Courts)
Vertical

Accountability type
(to whom is account
rendered?)

Democratic

Accountability
frame

Explicit
standards

Steady employment,
wages, collective
bargaining

Consumer law;
industry standards

Profit; reputation

Laws, statutes,
regulations
Maximum feasible
participation;
sunshine laws;
deliberative forums
Laws; statutes;
contracts

Table 1. Governance Network Accountability Framework.

Congressional authorizations and
appropriations processes.
Public comment process under the
Administrative Procedures Act.

Specific applications to regulatory
networks

(continued)

Precedence; reasonableness; Fines, civil penalties, and, in some
cases, the ceasing of operations.
due process; substantive
rights
Efficiency; social norms
Regulatory decisions (such as sharing
of incident reports, standard setting,
internal tests, etc.) that are driven
by profit maximization, reputation,
and social norms.
Affordability; quality;
Ability of consumer to make informed
satisfaction
decision based on firm’s ability and
willingness to comply (or exceed as
in the case of ISO) with regulatory
standards.
Mutual respect, participatory Ability of labor unions and other
decision making
collections of employees to exert
influence to protect members from
punitive action, promote service
and product quality, and ensure
compliance with performance
standards.

Representation of collective
interests; policy goals
Deliberation; consensus;
majority rule

Implicit
norms
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Vertical over agents;
subordinates;
contractees

Vertical over lay
persons; horizontal
within profession

Horizontal with peers

Professional (experts)

Collaborative (peers,
partners)

Relational
power

Bureaucratic
(principals,
supervisors, bosses)

Accountability type
(to whom is account
rendered?)
Implicit
norms

Written agreements;
decision-making
procedures;
negotiation regimes

Codes of ethics;
licensure;
performance
standards

Trust; reciprocity; durability
of relationships

Professional norms;
expertise; competence

Performance measures; Deference to positional
authority; unity of
administrative
command; span of control
procedures;
organizational charts

Explicit
standards

Inspector checklists for enforcement
actions, detailed reporting
requirements, reviews of
enforcement decisions, and ratings
of inspectors
Designing and enforcement of
internal compliance processes or
performance-based regulatory
standards based on profession or
industry best practices, rules, or
codes of ethics.
Sharing of regulatory information
(processes, internal firm operations,
etc.) and cooperation in designing
corrective action to remedy
noncompliance.

Specific applications to regulatory
networks

Source. Adopted from Koliba, Mills, and Zia (2011), and Mills and Koliba (2015). ISO = International Organization for Standardization.

Administrative

Accountability
frame

Table 1. (continued)
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performance standard. As such, the services, products, and information of
privately owned firms often are viewed as proprietary objects. Within regulatory governance networks, shareholder accountability takes the form of strategic decisions within firms of how, when, and what information to share
with regulators. While the field of economics would predict that firms would
look to design process-oriented or performance-based internal oversight or
audit programs that minimize cost while providing an acceptable level of
compliance, scholars have identified several instances where firms have gone
“beyond compliance” standards established by regulators due to both societal
pressures and a desire to maintain the organization’s reputational capital
(Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; May, 2005; Thornton, Gunningham, & Kagan,
2005; Thornton, Kagan, & Gunningham, 2009; van Erp, 2011). This body of
literature suggests that shareholder accountability is more than a blind focus
on profitability and stock price, but rather a multi-dimensional, nuanced, concept built not only on fear of fines for noncompliance but also the desire to
maintain and enhance the firm’s reputation for compliance.
Consumerist accountability is a market-based accountability predicated
on the ability of consumers to choose between alternative, competing goods
or services. Through a consumer’s choice or refusal to purchase, the consumer may be understood as holding a corporation accountable. Within regulatory governance networks, consumer accountability is manifested through
the ability of consumers to alter purchasing behaviors given a firm’s capacity
to meet regulatory compliance. Traditionally, the ability of consumers to
examine the firm’s capacity to meet regulatory compliance would be centered on incidents of noncompliance reported by regulators. However, scholars have examined cases, particularly in the area of environmental compliance,
where firms will participate in voluntary programs that design and set industry standards that are above the minimum levels, such as the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards (Darnall, Potoski, &
Prakash, 2010; Prakash & Potoski, 2006). By enacting these costly standards,
firms can differentiate themselves either as good corporate citizens or safe
operators in the eyes of their consumers. These government and industry centered voluntary programs provide more information to consumers to make an
informed decision about the comparative level of compliance of firms in the
marketplace.
Labor accountability encompasses the role that workers, be they formally
organized into labor unions or not, play in market frameworks of accountability. Rosenbloom and Shafritz (1985) situate labor’s role in providing
accountability feedback as the cycling of information about the effect or
results of the behavior of individual workers or whole labor systems back to
those individuals or labor systems so that “human behavior or organizational
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performance might be modified—presumably improved” (p. 252). This kind
of feedback generated from shareholders or managerial principals to agentlabor plays a role in ensuring job satisfaction and negotiated understandings
of performance, rendered at both the individual and collective levels. This
feedback can be directed in the other direction as well: Workers may provide
feedback to an organization that may allow for the development of improved
working conditions, refined modes of production and service delivery, and
assurances of quality control. Developing such feedback loops was the basic
premise of total quality management (TQM) efforts in the late 1980s and
1990s and continues to this day through development of participative decision-making models (PDM). Research into labor–management relationships
sheds additional light on the value that these kind of mutually reinforcing
feedback loops play. An optimal PDM relies on the existence of “viable collaborative mechanisms” that are “available and understood by management
and employees,” premised on an authentic desire to establish “win-win”
expectations (and realizations) among all parties. PDM requires that a level
of “trust and mutual respect must exist among the various parties” (Kearney
& Hays, 1994, p. 47). When this trust and mutual respect exists, and mechanisms for communication and feedback flow between employees, shareholders, and management, labor accountability is built on the informal capacity of
individual workers as well as workers organized into collective interests
(e.g., unions) to hold others accountable.
Angle and Perry (1986) describe PDM as existing within a culture of
“ambient conflict or cooperation.” Within more cooperative climates,
accountabilities to and from labor will be based on a level of trust. Cultures
of conflict between labor, shareholders, and management have led to the
establishment of organized labor unions.
A cooperative labor relations climate has been found to positively influence levels of organizational commitment and union loyalty, as well as productivity and quality of services (Deery & Iverson, 2005, p. 600). When labor
unions are present, the role of labor accountabilities is formalized around the
rights to negotiate contracts, and enter into formal grievance processes and,
in some cases, strike. These actions provide very explicit ways that organized
labor can hold market-based organizations, as well as governments that have
permitted civil servants to organize, accountable.
Thus, the role of labor as a contributor to market-based accountability
frameworks is shaped by the persistence of conflictual and/or cooperative
relations with shareholders and management. The FAA case presented here
highlights the critical role that an ambient cooperative culture, combined
with formal labor union roles, can play in ensuring that the airline industry is
safe—an obvious performance standard that is now expected by consumers,

Mills et al.

1487

elected officials, and citizens in general. Labor’s role in ensuring that safety
performance goals are attained is clearly highlighted in this case.
Table 1 provides an overview of the entire accountability framework,
including the democratic and administrative frames in play in complex regulatory situations. A detailed description of this entire framework can be found
in other publications cited in the table heading.
In this study, we explore the dominant accountability structures and the
trade-offs between accountability frames through an examination of voluntary self-disclosure programs operated by the FAA. The FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs provide an interesting and theoretically relevant case to
examine accountability structures for a number of reasons. First, unlike many
other industries, both the regulated entity (air carriers) and the regulator
(FAA) have a strong incentive to ensure a high degree of safety regardless of
cost. The alignment of motives and incentives in aviation safety is unique
because following an aviation crash or incident, the perception of air travel as
being “unsafe” can have serious financial implications not just for the air carrier involved in the incident but for the industry as a whole (Mills & Reiss,
2013). In other words, consumers’ fears can affect their decisions to fly, and
to fly with specific carriers. Second, the collaborative nature of the FAA’s
voluntary self-disclosure programs provides an appropriate venue to examine
accountability trade-offs that take place in transactional interactions between
regulated firms and regulatory agencies. Third, compared with other parts of
the world, the FAA’s programs are much more mature and well developed. In
Europe, for example, the EU only recently announced that it would direct its
safety agency (the European Aviation Safety Agency, [EASA]) to establish
voluntary reporting programs similar to those operated by the FAA. Finally,
the FAA case provides an arena to examine accountability structures in both
routine and challenging regulatory environments.
In this article, we use the FAA case to answer the following question:
Given the shift to process-oriented regulation rooted in collaborative, transactional authority between regulators and regulated firms, what are the dominant accountability structures in the FAA’s voluntary self-disclosure programs
and what are the trade-offs between accountability frames that determine the
effectiveness of the network of actors in ensuring safety?

Method
This article uses a single-embedded case study design (Yin, 2013) by focusing on two separate voluntary disclosure programs within the same agency
(the FAA). This approach allows for an integrated analysis of the voluntary
disclosure programs operated by the FAA along with the dominant
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Table 2. Data Used in FAA Case Study.
Interviewee/Observation
Voluntary Program Manager
Voluntary Program Manager
ASIAS Program Manager
Inspector
Principal Inspector
Inspector
Inspector
Program Manager
ASAP Program Manager
ASAP Program Manager
Director of Safety Management
Systems (SMS)
Director of Regulatory
Compliance
General Council
Event Review Committee
Observation
Event Review Committee
Observation

Organization

Date

FAA
FAA
FAA
FAA
FAA
FAA
FAA
NASA
Air Carrier
Air Carrier
Air Carrier

November 6, 2009
February 22, 2010
February 24, 2010
February 18, 2010
February 18, 2010
April 7, 2010
April 20, 2010
April 1, 2010
April 20, 2010
April 26, 2010
May 14, 2010

Air Carrier

May 20, 2010

Aviation Trade Association
Air Carrier, FAA, Labor
Union
Air Carrier, FAA, Labor
Union

June 1, 2010
April 27, 2010
May 13, 2010

Note. FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; ASIAS = Aviation Safety Information Analysis
and Sharing; ASAP = Aviation Safety Action Program.

accountability frames in each program. Yin (2013) argues that single-case
designs are appropriate for examining unique cases that can shed light on
new social phenomena. The FAA represents a unique governmental agency
through which to examine accountability in voluntary disclosure programs
for several reasons including the historically close relationship with commercial aviation, the history of reform within the FAA due to external perturbations including aviation disasters, the number of actors responsible for
ensuring aviation safety, the common goal of safety among regulators and
industry (Mills & Reiss, 2013), and the complex task environment in which
the FAA operates (i.e., regulate air commerce, promote aviation, manage air
traffic control, etc.).
The primary data used to develop the ASAP and VDRP case studies are a
total of 13 interviews and two participant observations (Table 2). Specifically,
the lead author interviewed three FAA headquarters staff responsible for
designing and implementing both ASAP and VDRP at the national level, four
FAA field managers/inspectors responsible for overseeing ASAP and VDRP
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implementation at four different air carriers, four air carrier managers (from
four different air carriers) responsible for implementing ASAP and VDRP, one
NASA official responsible for analyzing ASAP data at the national level, and
one aviation trade association official who was responsible for creating VDRP
and who has experience in implementing both programs. In addition, one of the
authors was granted access to two confidential ASAP Event Review Committee
(ERC) meetings with two separate air carriers. While the number of interviews
and observations is fairly limited, the sample of air carriers and their corresponding local FAA offices that were selected by the authors provide a representative sample comprised of a variety of air carriers including two major
legacy air carriers, one low-cost carrier, and one regional carrier. This diverse
sample of air carriers and local FAA offices also comprised a variety of relationships between the local regulator and regulated entity, ranging from very
collaborative to adversarial (see Mills, 2010), which provides additional theoretical leverage for assessing the dominant accountability frames that are present in both ASAP and VDRP. Individual interviewees were chosen through a
purposive snowball sampling approach. Specifically, following meetings and
interviews with FAA headquarters personnel familiar with all VDRP and ASAP
programs in operation, the authors contacted a sample of FAA local officials
and air carrier officials listed by the FAA headquarters staff for interviews
based on the type of air carrier (major, regional, low cost) and the type of perceived interaction (collaborative or adversarial) between the local FAA office
and the air carrier as identified by FAA headquarter personnel.
Secondary sources of data include scholarly and news accounts of the
FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs, documentation from Congressional
hearings, and reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT-IG). The secondary
sources of data were used to develop a detailed account of the SWA incident
that illustrated the difficulty of ensuring accountability in voluntary disclosure programs. The data collected via the interviews and observations were
analyzed using an open coding scheme developed to gain insight into the
behaviors by regulators and air carrier officials in each program. The researchers triangulated the coded interview data with several other sources of data
including GAO and DOT-IG reports, news accounts, and the ERC observations to derive the in-depth examination and analysis of accountability within
the FAA’s voluntary self-disclosure programs and the SWA incident.

Aviation Safety Regulation in the United States
The FAA is the primary regulatory agency in charge of air transportation in
the United States and is tasked with regulating both commercial and general
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aviation, promoting and encouraging the development of air service, developing and maintaining a system of air traffic control, and developing programs that mitigate the environmental effects of air transportation. A major
task of the FAA is to issue and enforce safety regulations that set minimum
standards covering manufacturing, operating, and maintaining aircraft. To
enforce its laws, rules, and certificates, the FAA employs approximately
4,000 aviation safety inspectors who conduct periodic inspections of airmen, maintenance operations, and repair stations to ensure compliance. The
FAA organizes its inspection activities through its Certificate Management
Offices (CMOs), which is a team of operations (pilots) and maintenance
inspectors dedicated to oversight of one specific air carrier. The FAA’s traditional approach to ensuring regulatory compliance prior to 2000 was to use
its inspector force to conduct spot-checks in the following operational areas:
•• Operations inspections focus on such items as pilots’ certification and
performance, flight crews’ training, and in-flight record keeping.
•• Maintenance inspections examine an airline’s overall maintenance
program, including the training of aviation mechanics, the development of maintenance manuals, and procedures for repairing aircraft
and their components.
•• Avionics inspections focus on electronic components of the aircraft.
•• Cabin safety inspections concentrate on cabin procedures, passenger
safety, and carry-on baggage (United States of America, GAO, 1999).
After a series of crashes in the early to mid 1990s, President Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security to investigate new strategies to reduce the number of aviation fatalities. The
recommendations of the Commission charged the FAA to work more closely
with industry to establish partnership programs, to more effectively use its
inspector workforce to oversee industry compliance, and to make better use
of emerging technologies to proactively identify safety issues (Gore, 1997).
In response to these recommendations, the FAA developed the Air
Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) in 1998 to fundamentally change
the way it conducted oversight of the nation’s largest air carriers. ATOS
emphasizes a system safety approach that extends beyond periodically checking airlines for compliance with regulations to using technical and managerial skills to identify, analyze, and control hazards and risks. Under ATOS,
inspectors develop surveillance plans for each airline, based on data analysis
and risk assessment, and adjust the plans periodically based on inspection
results (GAO, 2006). The risk-based approach to oversight inherent in ATOS
is dependent upon detailed operational and human factors data to constantly
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evaluate areas of risk and hazard within a carrier. The FAA’s limited inspector
resources made collecting this volume of information impossible.
To gain access to this valuable safety information, the FAA developed a
suite of voluntary self-disclosure programs that offer a regulatory incentive to
both air carriers and employees to voluntarily submit incident reports to the
agency. The FAA uses the data from voluntary self-disclosures and its close
interaction with industry to proactively target its oversight of air carriers,
while also identifying systemic areas of safety concern across the national air
space system. Importantly, the FAA’s traditional inspection processes remain
a vital part of the agency’s approach to regulatory oversight of air carriers.
The combination of robust voluntary self-disclosure programs with the FAA’s
proactive inspection protocols have been credited for the highest level of
safety in the history of the aviation industry (Mouawad & Drew, 2013). This
article will examine two of the most prevalent and widely used voluntary
self-disclosure programs: the ASAP and the VDRP.

The ASAP
Created in 1997, the ASAP is a voluntary disclosure program that allows
employees of air carriers to report safety-related events without the FAA or
the carrier taking punitive action against the employee based on the information in the report. Unlike other voluntary programs, ASAP involves a partnership between three entities (FAA, Air carrier, and the employee union) that is
codified through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). A representative
from the local FAA CMO, air carrier, and the employee union sit on an ERC
to decide if an ASAP report should be accepted into the program and what
corrective action, if any, is necessary to remedy the safety concern. ASAP
provides the FAA and air carriers valuable safety information it would not
otherwise have access to from those on the front lines of aviation. This information is used to proactively identify areas of risk and hazard in a carrier’s
operation and to develop corrective measures to address these potential safety
concerns. Today, there are more than 200 active ASAPs spanning a variety of
employee groups including pilots, mechanics, dispatchers, flight crew, and
ramp operators. Importantly, air carriers often have more than one ERC—one
for pilots, one for mechanics, and so on. A recent account estimates that there
are more than 60,000 ASAP reports submitted annually with the number
increasing by 20% annually (Johnson, 2012).
The ERC has several responsibilities including reviewing and analyzing
reports submitted under ASAP, determining through consensus if such reports
meet the criteria for acceptance into the program (report is made within 24 hr
of the incident and does not involve intentional neglect such as alcohol use),
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identifying actual or potential hazards from the information contained in the
reports, proposing solutions to safety hazards, and conducting an annual
review of the ASAP database to determine whether corrective actions have
reduced the reoccurrence of targeted safety events (Kelley, 2010). The ERC
will also conduct telephone or face-to-face interviews with employees who
reported more serious violations to engage in a deeper examination of the
circumstances that led to the incident. This collaborative investigative process gives the FAA inspectors much greater access to internal air carrier operations and procedures than in the past.
A unique feature of the ERC process is that members must come to consensus on both accepting the report into ASAP and the corrective action to
resolve the safety hazard. This requires a high degree of collaboration and
understanding of each actor’s political environment. As one air carrier ASAP
manager noted,
We use four union reps and they rotate one month at a time. I’ve known them
all for a long time, several of them were chief check airmen for me in my
previous jobs, so they have a trust in me and how I’m going to approach the
position, so I would categorize the relationship as excellent. (ASAP Manager
Interview, April 26, 2010)

An ASAP manager from another air carrier described the trade-offs
between labor and management that can arise in ERC meetings:
The union representative is the guy that fights the company over every one of
these disciplinary actions. He is the guy who goes into the boardroom and
defends the mechanic. It is hard for him to take his hat off. We come in here and
sit down to do an ASAP and the first thing out of his mouth is how many days
off did he get? I could care less about that. My goal is to sit down and figure out
what the hell is the issue and what could we fix. His goal is to figure out what
punishment the mechanic got. This isn’t the grievance committee, this is the
ERC. The FAA representative will tell him the same thing. He can be
argumentative. Don’t get me wrong, I was a mechanic. Most of the time, he
tries to put a spin on it that the company didn’t hold up their end of the bargain.
It’s always a training issue, it’s always a manpower issue. It’s not written
clearly in the policy. (ASAP Program Manager Interview, April 20, 2010)

When the ERC’s proposed corrective action may involve a more systemic
problem that requires a change to a company policy or procedure, the ERC
has little authority other than recommending to management that a change be
made. Some ERCs engage in strategic behavior by waiting to bring an issue
to the attention of senior management in each of the organizations (FAA, air
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Figure 1. Relationship between FAA Inspections and voluntary self-disclosure
programs.

Note. FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; CMO = Certificate Management Offices; ATOS
= Air Transportation Oversight System; ASAP = Aviation Safety Action Program; VDRP =
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program; ERC = Event Review Committee.

carrier, union) until a more severe event takes place (ERC Observation, April
27, 2010).
The data produced through ASAP are used by the air carrier and FAA
headquarters to improve safety procedures within the air carrier and to better
target increasingly scarce inspector resources to areas of hazard that are both
high risk and high probability (Figure 1). Each air carrier is required to have
a Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System (CASS) to analyze the trends
within the ASAP and VDRP data and to take corrective action as necessary to
address those trends. The local FAA CMO also uses the ASAP data trends
produced through a carrier’s CASS program to identify areas of risk and hazard within the operation. One CMO inspector notes, “Most of the changes
resulting from ASAP happen at the local CMO level as opposed to the
national level because most problems identified in ASAP are company-specific problems” (FAA Inspector Interview, February 18, 2010). Through its
participation in the ERC and its oversight of the air carrier’s CASS program,
the local FAA office is better able to gain a complete picture of the air carrier’s safety culture and is well positioned to assess whether or not the carrier
is “gaming” the system by encouraging its employees only to report minor
rather than more serious violations through both ASAP and VDRP.
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In addition to using ASAP data at the local level, the FAA wanted to be
able to mine this valuable source of data at the national level to look for systemic safety issues across air carriers. However, according to some of our
informants, air carriers and employee unions were very concerned about
turning identified ASAP reports over to the national FAA office to be shared
among competitors. As one air carrier official noted, “The program lives and
dies on confidentiality. As soon as that trust is violated, reports will dry up
and no one will tell anything” (ASAP Program Manager Interview, April 26,
2010). To ensure the confidentiality of the air carrier and the employee in
ASAP reports, the FAA decided to contract with the MITRE Corporation to
provide computer servers at each participating air carrier to house their deidentified ASAP and VDRP data. The FAA, in consultation with MITRE,
developed Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), which
is a collaborative government and industry initiative on data sharing and
analysis to proactively discover safety hazards, leading to timely mitigation
and prevention. Once approved by a joint-industry-FAA board, MITRE conducts queries of ASAP and VDRP reports on its servers so that the actual data
do not leave the carrier’s premises, and the compiled dataset is de-identified
by carrier.
To further protect the confidentiality of voluntary self-disclosures,
Congress passed and the FAA implemented an order that makes all materials
submitted under the ASAP and VDRP, including reports, ERC conversations,
a carrier’s database of records, trend data of ASAP reports, safety publications, and so on, exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. In addition,
ASAP and VDRP materials are not discoverable in legal proceedings against
employees or air carriers (Mills, 2010).

The VDRP
The VDRP is a program that offers certificate holding air carriers reduced
regulatory enforcement actions if they voluntarily report systemic problems
within their operation and work collaboratively with their local FAA office
on designing a comprehensive fix to the problem. For example, an air carrier
could self-disclose to the FAA that they were out of compliance with an
Airworthiness Directive (AD) that calls for monthly inspections of rudders
on 757s. In addition, an air carrier could self-disclose that its pilot training
manuals were out of compliance with current FAA regulations. For the FAA
to accept a self-disclosure, it must be reported within 24 hr of the air carrier
learning of the violation and be the first time the FAA has learned of the violation. Once the violation is self-disclosed to the FAA, the agency and the air
carrier work collaboratively to ensure that they have identified the root-cause
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of the violation and any systemic issues that led to the apparent violation.
Once the air carrier and the local FAA agree on a corrective action, they work
collaboratively on implementing the corrective action within the carrier. The
local FAA office also uses the information contained in the self-disclosures to
better target its inspections of the air carrier. One of the major differences
between other voluntary disclosure programs such as ASAP and VDRP is
that the former are employee reporting programs, while the latter is a company or air carrier disclosure program. This difference in the level of disclosure coupled with the need to collaboratively fix the problem identified in the
self-disclosure introduces a different decision-making process than is found
in employee-level programs such as ASAP. As the Director of Regulatory
Compliance for one air carrier noted,
In the self-disclosure process, the company is strategic about what corrective
actions it recommends. If we have a known issue with the computer system, we
are not going to go out and buy a new computer system just because there is a
quirk with it. Could it be fixed? Sure it could be fixed, anything could be fixed.
Does it make sense to do it? Hell no. (Director of Regulatory Compliance
Interview, April 20, 2010)

VDRP has a poor reputation among many in the public and in Congress
due to a high-profile failure of the program that occurred in 2010 involving
SWA and the FAA office responsive for overseeing it (United States of
America, DOT-IG, 2014). The incident illustrated the complexities of
accountability in process-oriented regimes as well as the importance of the
design of voluntary reporting programs. As an inspector for the FAA at the
SWA CMO, Charalambe Boutris was responsible for inspecting the airframe
and systems of the airline’s fleet of Boeing 737 jets. In the course of his
inspections and as early as 2003, Boutris found that SWA records of AD did
not meet the requirements of the law. He informed the SWA maintenance
officials and recommended on numerous occasions to his Supervisory
Principal Maintenance Inspector (SPMI) Douglas Gawadzinski that they file
a letter of investigation (LOI) against SWA. Gawadzinski refused the request
by Boutris and instead told him that a safety attributes inspection (SAI) would
be conducted to see if the airline was in compliance with federal regulations.
SAIs are internal audits conducted by the air carrier and reviewed by the FAA
on a routine basis. One year later, when Gawadzinski approved the SAI with
Boutris in charge, SWA maintenance officials met with Gawadzinski to have
Boutris replaced with a “more friendly supervisor” (United States of America,
House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
2008). This once again delayed the SAI, which according to FAA records was
3 years overdue.

1496

Administration & Society 50(10)

On March 15, 2007, SWA informed Gawadzinski that 47 of their aircraft
had over-flown the required fuselage fatigue inspection. On March 19, 2007,
SWA’s Manager of Regulatory Compliance, a former FAA inspector in the
SWA CMO, filed a VDRP claim with the FAA. However, after the VDRP
claim was filed, Boutris learned that the affected aircraft continued flying in
passenger operations until March 23, 2007, and that six of these aircraft had
up to 4-inch cracks in the fuselage, which can lead to a larger breach of the
aircraft frame and the rapid depressurization of the cabin (United States of
America, House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, 2008). On the VDRP application, Gawadzinski falsely confirmed that SWA had ceased operations of the planes after they discovered
the crack in the fuselage. In reality, SWA allowed the 47 aircraft to continue
in service for up to 30 months after they were due to be inspected. Boutris
took this information to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in August of 2007. The committee ordered the DOT-IG to conduct a review of the incident.
On April 3, 2008, the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, chaired by Representative James L. Oberstar D-MN, conducted a hearing into safety issues at SWA, and possible lapses in FAA oversight. In the testimony following the discovery of the violations, it became
clear that Gawadzinski had fallen trap to the “relaxed culture” in the SWA
CMO. Specifically, it was determined that Gawadzinski had allowed the noncompliant aircraft to continue to operate because of a close personal relationship with the Manager of Regulatory Affairs at SWA, who also happened to
be a former subordinate of Gawadzinski’s at the FAA. This relationship led
Gawadzinski to trust the intention and general competence of the manager
and SWA, even as evidence of lapses accumulated. An investigation of phone
records also found that FAA inspectors were in some instances calling SWA
maintenance staff to inform them ahead of time of what inspections were
coming to file VDRP claims before the FAA inspectors discovered the same
violations (United States of America, House of Representatives, Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2008).
In response to the congressional and public concern arising from the SWA
incident, the FAA ordered an immediate and nationwide audit of other airlines, to see if they too had any compliance problems with any AD that
affected their fleets. Each FAA office that oversees air carriers with aircraft
seating 10 or more passengers (so-called “part 121 carriers,” as the regulations governing them are found in chapter 121 of the Code of Federal
Regulations) was asked to audit 10% of the ADs applicable to each aircraft
type they operate. As a direct result of these “special emphasis” AD audits,
problems quickly surfaced with American Airlines’ fleet of MD-80s. On
March 25 and 26, 2008, FAA inspectors found discrepancies with some of
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American Airlines’ MD-80s, and American grounded part of its fleet, canceling a few 100 flights. On April 7, 2008, just 3 days after the congressional
hearings arising from the SWA events, FAA inspectors re-inspected 17 of
American Airlines’ MD-80s and found 16 of them to be out of compliance
with AD 2006-15-15. On April 8, faced with the prospect of imminent
enforcement action by the FAA, American Airlines chose to ground its entire
fleet of MD-80’s (more than 350 planes), putting these planes back into service only when the AD requirements had been completely met, and were to
the FAA’s satisfaction. From April 8 to 11, American Airlines canceled 3,100
flights, stranding or inconveniencing more than 250,000 passengers (United
States of America, Department of Transportation, Report of the Independent
Review Team, 2008).

Analysis
The FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs clearly involved multiple accountability frames that structured operations within the network. As a routine
matter, they seem to work well, indicating that the shift to a process-oriented
regulatory approach has led to increased safety (Mouawad & Drew, 2013).
However, trade-offs between accountability frames within regulatory networks can lead to breakdowns in accountability and eventually crises, as the
SWA case illustrates. We will examine the accountability structures both
under routine operations and during an extreme incident—the Southwest
case.

Routine Operations
The shift to process-oriented accountability has led to a shift from actors
pursuing their own, narrowed accountability frames and instead expanded to
include a more collaborative accountability framework to ensure the safety of
aviation operations in the United States (Table 3). Collaborative accountability is evident in ASAP as the FAA, air carrier, and unions work collaboratively to identify and fix potential safety hazards that occur during routine
operations. Within ASAP, the ERC (and the MOU that codifies the relationship) serves as a collaborative body that helps to minimize other accountability frames that each actor brings to the table. Specifically, while air carriers
remain interested in minimizing compliance costs, their participation in
ASAP illustrates that the reputation of a safe industry has become a shared
norm, and deeply integrated into their shareholder accountability frame. This
is further evident in the willingness of air carriers to share de-identified ASAP
and VDRP data with other air carriers and FAA headquarters through ASIAS.

1498

Administration & Society 50(10)

Table 3. Accountability in FAA’s Voluntary Disclosure Programs During Routine
Operations.
Accountability
frame
Democratic

Accountability type
(to whom is account
rendered?)
Elected
representatives

Citizens (and
interests groups)
Legal (Courts)

Market

Shareholder/owner

Consumer

Labor

Administrative

Bureaucratic
(principals,
supervisors, bosses)

Application to FAA voluntary selfdisclosure programs during routine
operations
Funding for inspectors through
appropriations process. Requests for
reports on operation of ASAP and
VDRP during FAA reauthorization
process.
Limited involvement due to Freedom Of
Iinfomation Act (FOIA) protections of
ASAP and VDRP disclosures.
FAA retains right to pursue legal and
punitive action against air carriers and
employees for non-disclosed violations.
Limited involvement by outside legal
entities due to non-discoverability of
ASAP and VDRP disclosures in legal
proceedings.
Desire of air carriers to protect
reputation of their company and the
industry for safety while also earning
profits for shareholders by minimizing
cost of corrective actions in ASAP and
VDRP processes.
Limited due to inability to make
informed choice on relative safety of
carriers because of ASAP and VDRP
confidentiality.
Desire of air carrier employee unions
to protect membership from punitive
action and play a participatory role in
enforcing safety standards during ASAP
and VDRP processes. Also, desire
by public sector unions to pursue
additional inspector hiring and protect
existing jobs from downsizing.
Desire by local FAA inspectors to avoid
high-profile incident by following
ASAP and VDRP guidance and by using
data collected through disclosures to
identify weaknesses in air carrier safety
program.
(continued)
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Table 3. (continued)
Accountability
frame

Accountability type
(to whom is account
rendered?)
Professional
(experts)

Collaborative (peers,
partners)

Application to FAA voluntary selfdisclosure programs during routine
operations
Desire by FAA inspectors, air carriers,
and union employees to learn from
ASAP and VDRP reports at the local
level through CASS and ATOS and at
national level through ASIAS. Analysis
is used to inform internal air carrier
audits and FAA inspection activities.
Air carriers, local FAA, and unions
working together to improve safety
through data sharing and analysis in
ASAP ERCs. Achieving consensus
for corrective actions through ASAP
ERCs. Air carrier and local FAA
office developing corrective action
for systemic issues identified through
VDRP. Air carriers sharing de-identified
data with FAA through ASIAS to
identify crosscutting safety issues at
national level.

Note. FAA = Federal Aviation Administration; ASAP = Aviation Safety Action Program;
VDRP = Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program; ERC = Event Review Committee; CASS =
Continuing Analysis and Surveillance System; ATOS = Air Transportation Oversight System;
ASIAS = Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing.

Focusing on the reputational aspects of shareholder accountability makes
collaboration with regulators and employees vital for air carriers who work to
protect their reputation by proactively addressing safety hazards in their organizations through the FAA’s self-disclosure programs.
Similarly, FAA inspectors lessen their reliance on bureaucratic accountability to foster collective accountability by relying more heavily on reporting programs such as ASAP and VDRP, and targeted inspections informed by
the data collected through those programs. In addition, FAA inspectors show
deference to collaborative accountability by not using information disclosed
through ASAP and VDRP as the basis of punitive actions such as letters of
investigation against employees or air carriers. That said, the FAA often does
rely on bureaucratic accountability in the implementation of ASAP by following published agency procedures to ensure that each partner in the program is operating in good faith.
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Finally, employee union representatives often rely less on formalized
labor accountability (grievance processes, strikes) and more on informally
driven labor accountability predicated on a culture of cooperation when participating in ASAP ERCs by agreeing to encourage its membership to report
and share the facts of violations to both the FAA and the air carrier. The culture of cooperation builds the capacity for the industry to forge “win-win”
expectations between labor (pilots and maintenance workers in particular),
shareholders and managers, and federal regulators. However, as our interviewees note, trade-offs between management and labor still exist even in
this more collaborative environment. Cooperative labor relations climate
have been found to positively influence levels of organizational commitment
and union loyalty, as well as productivity and quality of services (Deery &
Iverson, 2005, p. 600).
Importantly, the participation of the FAA, air carrier, and employee union
in ASAP and VDRP is rooted in trust among the partners that each will operate in good faith and hold one another accountable only within the construct
of the programs. In addition, the structural features of the programs including
the de-identification of reporters, the confidentiality of reports, and the
exemption from FOIA requests help to build trust through repeated collaboration and demonstrate a generally effective way of garnering a deeper and
more goal aligned sense of accountability between shareholders, labor
unions, and federal bureaucracies like the FAA. However, the focus on collaborative accountability within ASAP and VDRP has come at the expense of
more democratic accountability mechanisms. As Table 3 illustrates, the protection of information contained within ASAP and VDRP disclosures limits
the ability of citizens and consumer groups to know which air carriers are
safer than others. While the FAA retains the ability to pursue civil penalties
against air carriers and enforcement action against pilots, mechanics, and so
on, legal accountability for those who may be injured due to a safety hazard
identified in a self-disclosure is limited—not because access to the court is
barred, but because the information needed to prove violation or other negligence may be protected against disclosure by the programs’ terms. Finally,
accountability by elected representatives is not usually used during the normal operation of the FAA’s voluntary disclosure programs. However, the
threat of one of the actors in ASAP or VDRP to involve an elected official in
a dispute is a powerful incentive to operate in good faith. While each party
has this option, engaging political or legal accountability is risky as it may
open multiple parties, including the party filing the grievance letter to
Congress, to criticism through hearings or counter-suits. It can also undermine the trust that allows collaborative accountability to work well most of
the time. That risk can make participants hesitant to apply it without powerful
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reasons. At the same time, democratic accountability can be an important
counterbalance to a regulatory arrangement that has become overly collaborative as illustrated by the case of an abuse of VDRP by SWA.

The Challenges of Accountability in Process-Oriented Regulatory
Regimes
The SWA incident illustrates that even effectively structured process-oriented
regulatory regimes can be compromised by an overreliance on one type of
accountability. In the SWA case, a close relationship between an FAA supervisory inspector and SWA officials led to an overreliance on a collaborative
accountability frame that turned into, essentially, conclusion, and a failure of
bureaucratic accountability when the supervisory FAA inspector allowed
SWA, whose Manager of Regulatory Compliance was a friend and former
employee of the FAA CMO, to submit a disclosure to VDRP even though
FAA inspector Boutris had raised concerns about the violations contained in
the VDRP disclosure several months earlier. This example underscores the
“value neutral” aspect of collaborative accountability, as collaborators may
conspire to undertake actions, reinforce actions, or enable actions that work
against the public goals of regulation.
Furthermore, following receipt of the disclosure, the FAA CMO allowed
the SWA 737s to continue to fly even though they were out of compliance. In
this instance, SWA appears to have been focused more on short-term shareholder accountability through cost avoidance than on the possible damage to
the company’s reputation from a large-scale problem or fine. More importantly, the failure of accountability in relation to SWA led to harsher sanctions
when similar problems were discovered at American Airlines, which damaged the reputation of the entire aviation industry.
The case also illustrates one of the primary weaknesses of VDRP compared with ASAP, namely, the lack of labor accountability in the VDRP. The
involvement of either the union representing FAA inspector Boutris or the
union representing SWA mechanics would likely have prevented the SWA
incident by bringing professional and labor accountability to the review of
the claims made by Boutris. Instead, the close relationship between supervisory FAA inspector and the SWA Manager of Regulatory Compliance led to
an ineffective reliance on a narrow form of collaborative accountability that
led to a failure of VDRP to ensure compliance. We find the success of the
ASAP premised, at least in part, on the existence of a participatory decisionmaking process involving labor.
The reaction to the SWA case illustrates how elected official accountability can be used to improve the effectiveness of self-disclosure programs.
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When members of Congress learned of the violations at the Southwest CMO
and SWA, they called a hearing that put pressure on the FAA to conduct a full
safety audit of all major air carriers, thus putting an emphasis on professional
and bureaucratic accountability. The SWA case also illustrates that high-profile events can change the dynamics of accountability within regulatory networks by increasing the salience of the issues in play (Gormley, 1986).
During routine operations, consumer and legal accountability tend to be minimized by other forms of accountability. However, following a Congressional
hearing, consumers became acutely aware of safety issues in both Southwest
and American Airlines. Legal accountability played an increased role after
the Congressional hearing as both air carriers faced significant civil penalties
following the FAA’s safety audit, acting as a counterweight to collaborative
accountability. Because of the protections on voluntary self-disclosures, the
opportunities for consumer and legal accountability in aviation safety networks are often limited to after major incidents.
However, legal accountability was not a significant deterrent prior to the
discovery of violations outside of the VDRP process. Specifically, the FAA’s
process for issuing civil penalties for non-compliant aircraft is calculated
using a publicly available fine amount per aircraft operation. As the air carrier
continued to fly non-compliant aircraft, the legal (and financial) implications
became much more pronounced, leading to a stronger incentive not to truthfully self-disclose the violations. This suggests a possible limitation to the
desire of many regulatory agencies to maintain the ability to issue punitive
penalties to firms that do not disclose violations.

Conclusion
Within regulatory networks, there are many accountability frames that interact to ensure compliance with rules and laws. In the case of aviation safety,
ensuring that these accountability frameworks are aligned is of utmost importance given the serious risk a breakdown of accountability poses for travelers.
The FAA’s current approach to regulatory oversight—namely, through the
use of voluntary disclosure programs—has resulted in the institutionalization
of collaborative accountability mechanisms, while minimizing the dominant
accountability frames associated with each actor responsible for ensuring
regulatory compliance (in this case, the shareholder accountability of the air
carriers and the regulatory bureaucratic accountabilities of FAA regulators).
Specifically, the structural elements of the FAA’s voluntary programs including the involvement of multiple stakeholders, the threat of fines if air carriers
do not submit, and the promise of confidentiality of those who submit reports
serve as important balancing mechanisms to keep each actor honest and
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improve the overall effectiveness of the programs. This suggests that as regulators continue to design process-oriented regulatory programs, they must
include programmatic elements that allow for collaboration among actors
(i.e., the good cop), while still retaining the ability to issue punitive sanctions
against those who do not operate in good faith (i.e., bad cop). However, as
our analysis of the SWA case illustrates, the threat of a significant fine that
builds overtime can lead to a disincentive to self-disclose violations—reducing the overall level of compliance.
Several lessons emerge from the FAA’s experience with voluntary selfdisclosure programs that can inform the transition to process-oriented regulatory regimes in other complex industries such as banking, mining, and oil
exploration. First as the SWA case illustrates, collaborative accountability
can have significant potential limitations. As industry, regulators, and unions
become more intertwined, the risk for regulatory capture and noncompliance
may increase if regulators and legislators do not balance overarching collaborative accountabilities that pervade in successful process-based regulation
with other accountability mechanisms (for instance, bureaucratic accountability through FAA inspections and the value of strong labor accountability
in the ASAP). The most important contributing feature to the success of voluntary self-disclosure programs—trust between all partners—can lead to an
overreliance on collaborative accountability without the balance of professional or bureaucratic accountability. Relying on professional best practices
or established program guidance can reduce the risk of capture or overly
close relationships between regulators and firms. Second, labor accountability offers an important counterbalance to shareholder accountability that can
work to improve the reputation and performance of an individual firm and
entire industry. While aviation may be a unique industry, a high-profile disaster in other industries would also result in increased political attention that
could damage the reputation of the individual firm or the industry as a whole
through lawsuits (legal accountability) or a loss of profit (shareholder
accountability). Involving employees and their unions in the analysis of
safety data can help to mitigate potential incidents while also utilizing the
expertise of employees (professional accountability).
Our application of the governance network accountability framework to
the self-regulation of the airline industry reveals the important role that labor
unions play within the complex array of competing, commingling, and conjoining accountability pressures found within this case. We analyzed the
overall structure and functionality of process-based regulatory programs like
the ASAP and VDRP and by focusing in on a relevant “worst case” scenario
in which near tragedy was averted when the VDRP’s accountability framework failed. This examination of a narrower case within a system-wide case
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underscores the dynamic nature of the hybridized accountability regimes
found within process-oriented regulatory networks like the one studied here.
As the case of SWA underscores, accountability trade-offs will surface and
recede as contextual pressures ebb and flow over time. By applying the network accountability framework to this and other cases of regulatory failure in
similarly high-reliability industries, we may be in a better position to design
or redesign process-oriented compliance programs that are effective and consist enough to ensure continuity of regulatory goal attainment.
Our analysis also has several implications for aviation safety regulators in
other nations who use or are designing voluntary reporting programs. First,
much of the success of voluntary reporting programs depends upon the ability of industry management and labor unions to build trust to work collaboratively to ensure safety. As aviation safety regulators consider how to design
programs, it may be necessary to include trust-building forums and mechanisms to build a requisite level of trust for voluntary reporting programs to
operate effectively. Second, many nations around the world are seeing new
low-cost carriers begin operations. Often, new and smaller carriers lack the
institutional capacity and resources to fully implement voluntary programs
and are reluctant to participate. Designing incentives and resources to assist
these new carriers is vital to avoid the possibility of freeloading across the
industry. Finally, the FAA has benefited from collaborative data sharing
across the aviation system (i.e., airports, air traffic control, manufacturers,
etc.). Encouraging adoption of these programs across all aspects of the aviation system, including private air navigation service providers (ANSPs),
increases their robustness and effectiveness.
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